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A few messy notes
My friend Silvio Ferrari asked me to comment, with other scholars, a
2019 article by A.B. Seligman and D.W. Montgomery, which bears an
upsetting title that would imply that human rights became in no
uncertain terms “a tragedy”[1]. For me, this is a punch in the gut.
On the other hand, the main thesis of the essay, according to which
liberals have neglected the motivating force of belonging is by no
means foreign to me. I too have argued of the importance of taking
belonging into account for persuasiveness in rhetoric.[2] As
Gramsci[3] had already highlighted, it is an entirely different story if it
is “one of ours” or “one of theirs” who speaks. Moreover, we all know
the extraordinary success of frankly incorrect arguments, ad
hominem, or blatantly stupid.[4] Often, people give credit to messages
that are “irrational” from the very point of view of a mere selfish
calculation of their own interests. George Lakoff[5] argues this,
putting his skills as theorist of metaphors to good use, but this same
truth had also been grasped time ago by Epictetus, who had
proclaimed a golden rule to which today’s social sciences should not
be deaf: “What troubles people is not facts themselves but their
judgement about the facts”.[6]
In reality, the intuition that sense of belonging plays an important,
and perhaps underestimated role, and the obvious thesis that in a
multicultural society the encounter-clash between different ways of
living often provokes acute suffering and unbearable tensions, are
only the start of an analysis and not its conclusion. I particularly fear
that the key term ‘belonging’ is vulnerable to being revealed as more
slippery than predicted, particularly if it is opposed, as it is in the
work in question, to such an ambiguous word as ‘identity’. In this
moment of writing, I have not yet worked out a precise position. I will
therefore proceed with notes, in no predetermined order. I cannot
even rule out arguing against myself.
A final preliminary note: I must confess that, as a “left-wing
intellectual”, I am the least appropriate person to explain collective
behavior. Intellectuals have gotten all predictions of recent political
developments wrong. They were taken by surprise because of their
snobbish annoyance at the banality of clichés, at what is “the same for
all”, at the so-called homogenizing factors, searching for what
distinguishes them from others. Actually, they are more akin to Walter
Benjamin, who deplored the reproducibility and mass enjoyment of
art, than to Andy Warhol. After all, the myth of the “good savage” dies
with difficulty: we hardly tolerate that the “people” can make errors
in their evaluations or that the “crowd” let itself be seduced by gross
and unacceptable messages from the point of view of minimal ethics,
which does guide isolated individuals, although it is known that
senators boni viri, senatus mala bestia. To have an understanding of
these problems, it would probably be more useful to follow reality
television shows or social networks than to read weighty tomes of
political philosophy. But those in my profession have difficulty
realizing this.[7]
 
The stakes
The paper submitted to our attention by Seligman and Montgomery
should be contextualized within the framework of the initiatives of
CEDAR (Communities Engaging with Difference and Religion)[8], an
international organization, which carries out fundamentally
pedagogical activities, teaching activists and leaders of different
communities around the globe different techniques for coexistence,
based on the ability to accept, rather than negate or overcome
differences of perspectives primarily in matters related to religion. To
know more, one should read Living with Difference, a book that
illustrates the programs, aims and methods of the organization.[9]
We are therefore faced with a text that, far from being a dispassionate
theoretical analysis, is connected to fieldwork, halfway between an
experiment of anthropological assumptions and a proactive, if not
openly persuasive and “educational” approach (for the transmission
of certain values). Here, however, I will restrict myself to examining
the article as it if were the product of purely academic research.
As mentioned above, the authors’ central idea is that the rhetoric
around human rights has neglected the need for a “shared belonging”,
that is, the need for every person “to be a member of a particular
community, with a particular past, particular stories, smells, tastes,
jokes, obligations, recipes, moral judgments, boundaries of what is
permissible and prohibited, basic frames of meanings, fears and
desires”. In this regard, Seligman and Montgomery, make sure to
emphasize strongly that “membership in community”, which plays a
considerable role in our conception of a “good life”, is removed from
choice. To put it in their words: “It is not for an individual to merely
pick and choose belonging”.[10]
Belonging is non-fungible. On the other hand, Seligman and
Montgomery argue that one cannot have universal belonging,
extended to all human beings, such as, in their opinion, is postulated
by rights. The latter, if compared to the protective warmth of a
community of trust, would only be a freezing utopia. The “abstract”
character of rights, abstract and impersonal as it is incapable of
arousing real emotions, is repeatedly lamented by the authors. If we
can speak of help, here we are faced with “legalized assistance
programs doled out by cold bureaucratic organizations and welfare
agencies”. Moreover, those who enjoy the same rights often have
nothing in common except falling in the same abstract situation, being
catalogued under the same label. Often, they do not share any type of
experience, or form of life whatsoever.
Strangely, in this exposé, belonging never comes into conflict with
believing, such as in the not-infrequent case of atheists calling for
large crucifixes to be put up in public spaces just to spite Muslim
immigrants. The authors look upon multiculturalism with suspicion
and transform “identity” that is demarcated by rights with each of us
possibly containing many identities at the same time, into something
that is possessed. They do not fail to observe that “having an identity
is not the same as belonging to a community”. Obviously, the objection
to liberals that intersperses the piece is a usual effort of
communitarianism: making the individual an island, “a morally
autonomous agent devoid of inherited ties and obligations”. On the
contrary, the individual does not exist outside of a social context
characterized by a shared narrative: the only thing to guarantee
“human flourishing”, since the tastes and values of individual people
do not develop inside a vacuum.
This analysis, however, does not hold. It is not simply a matter of
building coexistence between “tolerated” religious groups, which
govern themselves as with the millet of the Ottoman Empire. 
Furthermore, liberals do not intend to construct a “universal
citizenship”, nor do they try to imagine the individual as an abstract
entity. The stakes are another. Liberals claim the space to discuss
dominant values, possibly those of the minority group to which they
belong, and if they so wish, to make the personal choices that detach
themselves, in whole or in part, from them.
This means being “undemocratic” in a certain sense, that is being able
to say explicitly that collective decisions are in many cases, irrational,
stupid and wicked, or that the tradition in which one is born and
raised in does not have the last word. In this sense, the human rights
movement is the bearer of an emancipatory message with a
disruptive emotional force. Think of Kant’s “sapere aude!”.
At the level of individual existential situations, the enlightenment of
rights defends anyone who makes different, if not opposing,
identitarian choices to those of their group. The paradigmatic story
could be the one imagined by the writer Chaim Potok, of Asher Lev
who becomes a painter despite belonging to an ultra-Orthodox Jewish
family who is therefore hostile to forms of figurative representation.
Or the story of the Somali model, Waris Dirie who denounced female
genital mutilation as one who was subjected to it. Or that of anyone
who rebels against the emotional blackmail of one’s clan as regards
their profession, sexuality, choice of partner and friends, etc. Here the
ambiguous term “identity” is not declined as an identification with
respect to a specific group, but as the feeling of being a bearer of
personal characteristics that are as a whole unique and inimitable.
More than participation, this experience is one of being able to say no
to the voice of warm ties, those of our family or of the “community”.
Rights do not in themselves ensure a good life. That depends on us.
But certainly, rights are presented as a condition sine qua non of a
good life. This occurs in a kaleidoscopic and open world like the
present one, in which a growing number of existential models – and
temptations? – are within our reach.
On a positive legal level, however, it is always said that rights are a
“counter-majority”. This claim is not ritualistic. We need that the
guarantees that protect rights to be enforced independently of the
personal morals of the heads of institutions and, necessarily, also
against the opinions of the majority. The crux today, when it comes to
“populism” is just that. In fact, a clash is taking place between those
who intend to weaken those guarantees and those who wish to keep
them by strengthening them. The sovereignty of states has very little
to do with this conflict.
In the following pages, I would like to make some additional
considerations about equal belonging (§3) and about individual
autonomy (§4). Finally, (§5) I will put forth some conclusive reflections
on the – limited, but not inexistent – possibility of falling prey to
collective symbolic processes.
 
Agoraphobia vs. Agoraphilia
In the article under discussion, a romantic and welcoming idea of
belonging is cultivated. Even if one does not want to maintain the all-
pervading, or even theological, nature of Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy
opposition, it is necessary to bear in mind that love for one’s “own”
often corresponds to hatred for an enemy, real or invented.
Negativities are projected outwards. Therefore, not only can we not
speak of universal belonging, but also speaking of universal love, for
instance in the Christian sense, is highly problematic. One needs to
know how to see the sinister shadow of belonging that hangs over the
rest of humanity. We move from conspiracy theory to the
demonization of the enemy. It is still ok to look at “barbarians” with a
complacent smile. Seligman and Montgomery understand that
“belongings” are at the root of symbolic processes. It is well known
that symbols can both include and exclude. But I fear that the authors
underestimate the violence of exclusion. They do not tell us how
strong the desire is to kill the enemy, how intensely the axiom “mors
tua vita mea” has a hold over people.[11] They limit themselves to the
bland statement that, all things considered, belonging has boundaries.
“But exclude they must” they say, thinking of a reframing of their
respective prejudices, of an honest and peaceful negotiation of real or
symbolic contrasts, rather than something that could take on
terrifying and unbearable features.
Bertrand Russell, whose pacifist ideas are well known, describes in his
autobiography the wild cry of jubilation at the shooting down of a
Zeppelin airship with which the Germans were bombing London: “[…]
we heard suddenly a shout of bestial triumph in the street. I leapt out
of bed and saw a Zeppelin falling in flames. The thought of brave men
dying in agony was what caused the triumph in the street.”[12] Now I
wonder if another recent event could be compared to Russell’s wild
scene: in 2017 a group of minors from Verona burned a Moroccan
man alive while he was sleeping in his car.[13] I know, in one case
they are “righteous citizens” and in another “youngsters”, in the first
case they are strong subjects and in the second, weak ones. But the
analogies between the two situations remain striking. On the other
hand, if moral judgment is suspended, one can see that in both stories
the same primordial mechanism is triggered, however you evaluate it.
In the same way, a group of youngsters can torment a disadvantaged
companion without feeling guilty or ashamed. Is it strange? But if one
pays attention, one realizes that senses of guilt or shame resurface in
those who appear to break from the group solidarity. Social morality,
normally, is only valid in internal relationships among members of a
community. In this sense, the idea of equality and the identification
that follows is at its origin a rare good, that excludes many. Freud
explains these dynamics with a penetrating remark: “The individual
citizen can with horror convince himself in this war of what would
occasionally cross his mind in peace-time – that the state has
forbidden to the individual the practice of wrongdoing (Unrecht) not
because it desires to abolish it, but because it desires to monopolize it,
like salt and tobacco”.[14]
Here, the discussion becomes extremely complex. Behind the warmth
of belonging often hide forms of collective violence. One can even fall
in love with revolution. A town square packed with people waving
flags reminds us, channeling it, the belligerent enthusiasm criticized
by Russell.
In reality, the unifying objects gradually proposed are increasingly
unstable, and therefore less dangerous if their imaginary character is
revealed. We are referring to nation, race, class, religion. Behind these
particular “citizenships” are hidden conflicts, divergences of views,
different stories. Rarely, and only for the smallest communities can we
speak of mutual familiarity. But in open society one can hybridize and
mix in many ways.[15] One need only get on a bus to hear many,
incomprehensible languages. Somehow, people’s mobility represents a
guarantee. In an age of maximum interconnectivity, it is difficult to hit
an enemy without damaging also “one’s own”. The nexus between
population and territory, in the name of which many bloody wars
have been fought, has loosened.
On the other hand, there are never-before seen risks that come with
these new forms of communication. The new town squares, where
people can congregate at little cost, are virtual ones created by online
platforms. Even if the physical squares remained empty like De
Chirico’s metaphysical ones, which we could ideally contrast with the
flag-filled, overflowing square of Guttuso’s painting Funerals of
Togliatti, there would still be fictitious (internal?) squares that would
fill in their stead. This creates an impression of direct participation in
public affairs, without mediation, albeit with very volatile forms of
aggregation. And this is what brings us to the discussion in the next
two sections.
 
Why do so many young people get tattoos?
I am not sure that I am able to reliably answer the question that is this
section’s title. When I hear the word “tattoos”, the first thing that
comes to mind is Cesare Lombroso’s L’uomo delinquente [Criminal
Man] (1876, V. ed. Fratelli Bocca, Turin, 1897), and the images that
accompany it. The famous anthropologist believed that tattoos –
presented by him in a crescendo from obscene to gruesome – in the
West were a phenomenon limited to some marginalized subcultures,
such as prisoners, sailors, and prostitutes. They were deviancy and
picturesque anomalies exhibited before bourgeois respectability.
Those that are explored, are underworlds worthy of Eugène Sue and
his Mysteries of Paris. By now, as many know, the situation has been
turned on its head. Tattoos are now widespread among young people
of good family (as well as the less young).
Even the subjects depicted have changed. Fewer explicit images.
Abstract figures and writing prevail, preferably small. Sometimes,
they appear to be vaguely tribal, regressive, with primitive elements
(such as African masks in Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon). Except
that in general, though with some exceptions, the symbols of our
culture are not imprinted. Exotic and decorative factors seem to be
dominant here. Almost as if the tattoo is a sort of fashionable item of
clothing, which however cannot be removed.
My hypothesis is that the basic idea of Westerners who get tattooed is
expressed in the narcissistic idea of making use of their body as they
wish; in some cases also to mark its own “uniqueness” (I do not
exclude, however, that instead it sometimes indicates a common
belonging to a particular subgroup).
Through this symbolic shortcut it could seem that the proverbial
“mass-man” coined by Ortega y Gasset acquires a face. However, this
is not the case.
To be clear, an illusion is being cultivated. The same that the
“profiled” consumer falls victim to; or those who believe they are
participating in a political movement by approving all its decisions,
programs and policies, online. It goes without saying that this a fake,
or in the best case wishful thinking.
What emerges from this brief analysis on the practice of tattoos is a
fictitious autonomy of the individual, who in many cases believes is
choosing wisely, weighing the pros and cons, but instead falls victim to
mechanisms out of his control. This is what happens for freedom and
equality.[16] In other words, it can be said that the genealogy of the
idea of autonomy is much less straightforward and noble than it
appears. Nor can we pretend that an uneducated person be a
complete individual. On the contrary, one becomes an individual
through education, learning to think critically with his own head.
I am convinced that autonomy, in order to become an effective value,
and not irresponsible egotism with no capacity to choose, needs
detachment and mediation. At an institutional-political level, the
intermediate bodies – and with them the prohibition of the imperative
mandate pursuant to article 67 of the Italian Constitution – should be
staunchly defended. “You are all of us” is always mendacious[17];
likewise, any direct representation is a dangerous illusion, especially
in a period such as this one, in which the rule of law and the
protection of human rights, which necessarily presuppose elites to
implement them, are under attack.
 
Symbols and mediations. An attempt at a conclusion.
Returning now to Seligman and Montgomery, I feel I should conclude
that the culture of human rights, that now characterizes the best of
the left, is not a “tragedy” at all. With all the respect I have for
belonging, that the authors conceive in a well-reasoned and balanced
way[18], I would say that rights are on the side of the remedy, more
than that of the problem.
The problem is represented in the divergence that is created between
symbolic processes of belonging and the inability of the political class
to solve concrete questions. It is something that is happening
everywhere, also because it is a process that is heavily influenced by
the media and notoriously, to quote Marshall McLuhan, the medium is
the message.[19]
Knowing how to win an election does not mean knowing how to
govern.
Laws, in fact, become more and more “symbolic”, more suited to
sending the “right message” to the public rather than to provide a
country with substantial solutions.
Politics has been confused with entertainment since it was understood
that there is little difference between techniques for selling toothpaste
or soap and those needed to sway an electorate.
On the other hand, this effect is enhanced by years of miseducation, or
an inadvertent education in eristics, through shows that are based on
futile discussions, all fake, where the theme, often centered around
gossip, is pretentious. All that matters is “to have won”.[20]
The culture and politics of rights represent the solution because they
make differences stand out in an increasingly pluralistic and
interconnected world. The basic idea is not that we are all the same,
but that despite being different, we are forced to live together. The
authors think only of coexistence between communities. Instead in
my opinion, it is essential that the ability of individuals to make
choices, midway between different value systems, is also developed,
loosening the symbolic grip in which belonging is based. Rights, if we
remove the maternal and emotional blackmail of one’s group,
relativize cultural values, taboos and religious symbols, and allow us
to understand that social myths, even those on which a constitution is
founded, are imaginary constructions that manipulate the past. To put
it bluntly, why should we prefer the story of the Founding Fathers to
that of the African Americans, if they are both, for the most part,
invented? We are in need of a deconstructive “metaphorology”.
Ultimately, recognizing that no one is truly a prisoner of their group’s
mythologies, rights open essential spaces of freedom and realistic
mediation of interests. The screaming crowd should not be indulged.
And realizing that The People is an ambivalent dream, one of many, a
dream that quickly fades, helps. Let us not talk about the disasters
generated by long-lasting dreams, from which we struggled to wake
up, which marked the last century, if not to say that the contemporary
culture of rights is also built on the collective memory of those
disasters.
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